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Abstract
Rural development programs in India are implemented for a variety of reasons.
A key question is whether such transfer spending by the government is consequen-
tial for the local economic activity. This chapter estimates the multiplicative effects
of rural transfer spending on state agricultural output using a novel dataset of state-
wise expenditure on all major rural development programs that were operational
between 1980-2010. Using government reports as narrative evidence we show that
the principal motivation to introduce a new scheme is either (i) to replace old in-
efficient programs or (ii) to address a deep-rooted social or economic issue that
has not been addressed by any existing program. Importantly, the introduction of
a new scheme is largely independent of the current or prospective output fluctu-
ations. Using this narrative evidence we isolate the “introductory variation” that
occurs every time a new program is introduced as a measure of change in transfer
spending that is exogenous to local output fluctuations. The results suggest that
local variations in rural transfer spending can be quite consequential for the local
economic activity in rural areas.
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1 Introduction
The series of stimulus packages rolled out globally following the recent financial crisis
have reinvigorated the debate on the effectiveness of fiscal interventions. In response,
there is a renewed interest in understanding the size of “the multiplier” – measured
as the effect on economic activity due to exogenous fiscal impulses. While most of the
related literature has focused on the aggregate effects at the national level, several recent
contributions have addressed the local output effects of such policy interventions.
Further, a majority of studies estimate the multiplicative effect of a specific com-
ponent of government spending – government purchases – defined as government in-
vestment plus consumption. While many useful lessons have emerged from this literat-
ure, government transfers have received surprisingly little attention. This represents a
significant disconnect between the research and its policy relevance as most of the re-
cent increase in government spending across the globe can be attributed to government
transfers. Oh and Reis (2012) report that transfers accounted for more than 75% of
the increase in government spending in the US between 2007 and 2009, comparable to
the OECD median of 64%. They further conclude that most of the increase in transfer
spending during this period was discretionary.
The heavy reliance on transfer spending as a stimulus instrument may be motivated
by the benefits of well-targeted transfers which can have expansionary effects on output
while addressing distributional concerns.1 Also, while new investment projects may
involve substantial decision and implementation delays, injecting funds into already
existing social projects allow for a timely response to a crisis. As the Review of the
Economy, India 2008 notes: “in the prevailing situation . . . speedy implementation of
already funded projects at the Central and State levels is important for the fast revival of
the economy.” It is therefore not surprising to note that along with the introduction of the
fiscal stimulus package in India during early 2009, transfer spending in the form of loan
waivers, subsidies, and employment guarantees also peaked at the same time. Hence,
to the extent social transfers are used as a stimulus instrument, it becomes important to
understand their effect on local economic activity.
In this paper, we estimate the local multipliers corresponding to spending in rural
1Woodford (1990) shows that transfer spending can be expansionary if it alleviates liquidity con-
straints which result in higher investment and output. Using a heterogeneous agent model, Oh and Reis
(2012) show that while transfers across households can increase consumption and labor supply for some
households and lower it for others, the former effect can dominate if transfers are well targeted. Using
a New Keynesian model with savers and borrowers, Bilbiie, Monacelli, and Perotti (2013) show that
transfer multipliers are positive under sticky prices and small and close to zero when prices are flex-
ible. Giambattista and Pennings (2016) use a New Keynesian model with constrained and unconstrained
agents to show that transfer multipliers can be comparable to purchase multipliers if monetary policy
accommodates (or is unable to counter) the higher inflation generated due of transfer spending.
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development programs in India.2 While such programs are implemented for a variety
of reasons, a key question concerns the efficacy of spending under these schemes on the
local economic activity. We use a novel panel data of expenditure incurred under major
rural development programs between 1980 and 2010 to construct a measure of exogen-
ous changes in rural transfer spending at state-level. We use this measure to estimate
the transfer spending multipliers for the agricultural output at state-level. Hereafter, we
refer the agriculture sector multiplier at the state level just as the state-sector multiplier.
The state-sector multiplier we estimate differs conceptually from most of the literature
that estimates “local multipliers” for output or income at state, province, or county level.
Our choice of state-sector multiplier stems from the important advantages it has over
area specific local multipliers. The state-sector multiplier, for example, sheds light on
the ability of such programs to counter local (agriculture) sector-specific shocks. This
issue is even more relevant for emerging economies like India where the agricultural
output is highly sensitive to weather shocks.
While we check for sectoral and spatial spillover effects of rural transfers, our focus
is on the response of state agricultural output to local variations in transfer spending
due to the following observations. First, given that these programs operate exclusively
in the rural areas of the states, an ideal choice would be to measure the impact on local
economic activity by estimating the spending effects on state rural income. However,
unavailability of any measure on state rural income restricts such an analysis. Therefore,
we focus our attention on the sector that most closely corresponds to the rural economy
– the agriculture sector. As Figure 1(a) shows, nearly three-quarters of the rural work-
force is employed in the agriculture sector. This underscores the heavy reliance of the
rural economy in India on agriculture and allied activities.
Second, most of the programs we study indirectly support the agriculture sector by
organizing public works on irrigation and land development. Further, these programs
aim to assist the marginal farmers, landless households, and the unemployed workers
during the lean agricultural season. Therefore, relative to other sectors, rural transfer
spending most comprehensively impacts the agriculture sector. Finally, unlike most
developed economies, agricultural output in India forms a substantial portion of the
gross domestic product. As Figure 1(b) shows, the national agricultural output accounts
for more than 20% of the aggregate national GDP for most of the sample while this ratio
is as high as 35% in the early 1980s.3 Hence, our measure of the state-sector multiplier
is likely to capture any first order effects of rural transfer spending on local economic
2We interchangeably refer rural development programs as just programs or schemes.
3The correlation between growth rates of real agricultural output and total output is ≈ 0.7 (p-value <
0.01).
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activity.
Figure 1: Agriculture Sector in India: Employment and Output
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(b) National Agricultural Output
Source: Employment data is from National Sample Survey (various rounds). Output data is from Central
Statistics Office (CSO). Figure 1(a) summarizes the proportion of the employed workers in rural areas
that are involved in the agriculture sector. Figure 1(b) shows the national output from agriculture and
allied activities as a percentage of aggregate national GDP (at factor cost and constant prices).
Since fiscal interventions can be sensitive to cyclical fluctuations in income, the
literature follows three key identification strategies to avoid biased multiplier estimates.
The first is the VAR based approach that relies on structural assumptions regarding
the dynamics of output and fiscal policy (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Mountford and
Uhlig, 2009; Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh, 2013). The second identification strategy is
to find an instrument that provides an external source of variation in the fiscal policy
that is uncorrelated with current output fluctuations. Several recent studies using sub-
national data (discussed below) exploit institutional information to employ instrumental
variable approach for identification.
The third strategy consists of extracting a subcomponent of spending or taxes that
can be argued as independent of current macroeconomic environment. Following Barro
(1981), many studies have for example argued that military expenditure in the US dur-
ing major wars can be regarded as exogenous as these conflicts did not have a direct
effect on the US economy and their timing was not influenced by aggregate business
cycles. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2011) use narrative records such as
news reports in Business Week to identify changes in government purchases due to
military build-ups and other events that are independent to the state of the economy.4
Romer and Romer (2010) use US legislative records to identify tax policy changes that
4Ramey (2011) introduces another shock series using forecast errors of professional forecasters.
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can be categorized as countercyclical measures or changes that were made for long-
run growth or other ideological reasons. They argue the latter subset of tax changes to
be uncorrelated to current macroeconomic shocks and hence use them to estimate tax
multipliers.
Our identification is based on the third strategy and it most closely follows the
Romer and Romer (2010) narrative analysis approach. We use narrative analysis to
identify changes in transfer spending at state-level that occur during the implementa-
tion of new nation-wide programs which are not motivated by current or prospective
fluctuations in local output. Using official government reports and financial statements
as narrative evidence, we find that the principal motivation to introduce a new program
by the central government is either (i) to address a deep-rooted social or economic issue
that has not been sufficiently addressed by any existing scheme or (ii) to replace old
program(s) because of the inefficiencies identified in them. Consequently, we use the
regional variation in transfer spending that corresponds to the inter-state heterogeneity
in implementing new programs to estimate the “state-sector multiplier”. Our identify-
ing assumption is that the central government does not introduce a new scheme – like
a subsidy program for rural housing in 1995 – because the states that spend a greater
amount of program funds during the year of implementation are doing poorly relative
to other states.
This assumption is similar in spirit to Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) who exploit
the heterogeneity in state-level military spending due to military build-ups and draw-
downs, except that we consider the heterogeneity in state-level transfer spending as
exogenous only during the “introductory period” of a new program. We do not regard
the broader variations in state-level transfer spending as exogenous since unlike military
spending in the US, transfer spending in India can be highly endogenous to cyclical
fluctuations in output. In other words, while local economic conditions may cause
disproportionately higher spending in a state under a program that is well established
in the system, it is highly unlikely that a new nation-wide program is implemented in
response to a state-specific shock.
We use our narrative records to identify the size, timing, and motivation of all major
program introductions between 1980 and 2010 to construct our state-level “narrative
shock series”. We regard this shock series as a measure of change in rural transfer
spending that is uncorrelated with local output fluctuations. While relying on the mo-
tivation for program introduction helps us rule out reverse causality due to local shocks,
an immediate concern is that our estimates may still be downward (or upward) biased
if the state-level variation during program introduction is correlated with key district
characteristics that may in turn influence local economic activity. To check for this,
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we test and find no correlation between our shock series and the state to national rural
poverty ratio – which is claimed as a key factor in the allocation of funds from the
central government to the states for many programs.
Secondly, our multiplier estimates are quite robust to the exclusion of state fixed
effects, indicating that the variation in transfer spending due to the implementation of
a new program is largely orthogonal to state characteristics. These findings bolster
our identification strategy and are also consistent with recent studies on employment
schemes in India that find heterogeneity in program implementation to be likely due to
idiosyncratic supply factors like political will and capability to implement rather than
the demand for the program (Imbert and Papp, 2015; Bahal, 2016). Finally, the use of
sub-national data allows us to estimate local multipliers after controlling for national
monetary and fiscal policies, along with aggregate fluctuations using year fixed effects.
We estimate the local multiplier to be around 1.4 on impact which increases to 2.1
after including the effects of past spending. In other words, when relative per capita
transfer spending in a state increases by 1% of the state’s agricultural output, the re-
lative per capita agricultural output increases by approximately 1.4% on impact and
2.1% overall. In contrast, using the broader measure of year-on-year changes in total
transfer spending at the state-level yields multiplier estimates that are an order of mag-
nitude smaller and insignificantly different from zero, indicating a substantial down-
ward bias in comparison to the estimates obtained from the shock series. This reaffirms
our premise that while state-wise heterogeneity in expenditure during the introduction
of a new program is largely due to variations in program implementation that are un-
likely to be related to local economic conditions, the same cannot be said about the gen-
eral annual variation in state-level transfer spending. We also find no relevant sectoral
or cross-border spillover effects due to transfer spending in adjacent states, suggesting
rural economies to be quite “insular” from each other in this regard.
Together with this study, there are several recent works that exploit sub-national
data to estimate local multipliers. Acconcia, Corsetti, and Simonelli (2014) instru-
ment temporary contractions in public spending at province-level in Italy on evidence
of mafia involvement to estimate the government spending multiplier between 1.5-1.9.
Serrato and Wingender (2010) use as an instrument, the census shock due to the meas-
urement error in US census estimates to estimate the government spending multiplier to
be around 1.88.5 Relative to these studies, our study makes three novel contributions to
5Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010) study the relative multiplicative effects of government grants
in US states during the New Deal using a swing voting measure as an instrument. They report an output
multiplier of 1.67 corresponding to grants on public work and relief. Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) study
cross-sectional variation in Medicaid transfers in US states and estimate an output multiplier of around
2. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) estimate an “open economy relative multiplier” around 1.5.
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the literature. First, while most of the works focus on advanced economies, we provide
empirical evidence on the size of local multipliers in a monetary and fiscal union for
a developing country. Second, unlike most of the literature that focuses on the output
and income effects of government purchases, we study government expenditures that
can be largely classified as transfers. Finally, we use the narrative analysis approach
to construct a measure of state-wise innovations in transfer spending to evaluate the
state-sector effects of rural transfers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the state-level
shock series using narrative analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical model. Section 4
and 5 respectively discuss results and extensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Narrative Analysis
2.1 Sources
The primary sources for the narrative analysis are the Annual Reports of the Ministry of
Rural Development and Annual Plan documents of the Planning Commission of India
(various issues). We systematically consult both these official documents to identify the
major rural development programs that were operational between 1980 and 2010. The
documents contain all relevant information like the date of program implementation, the
principal motivation to introduce the program, and whether the new program was im-
plemented in a phase-wise manner. The annual financial statements or progress reports
in these documents provide state-wise annual expenditure data for all active programs.
Our measure of total rural transfer spending at the state level is simply the aggregate
expenditure incurred under all active programs in a financial year.6 We hence have a
panel data of 23 states for 30 years (690 observations).
2.2 Rural Development Programs in India
The first step is to identify the key rural development programs that were introduced
between 1980 and 2010. We limit our attention to major nation-wide programs that were
implemented by the central government. We do not consider programs that existed as
sub-schemes of larger programs. This is to avoid double counting of expenditure under
the parent program. Also, expenditure data at the state-level is usually not available
for small sub-schemes. Our objective is to study the programs whose introduction had
6The Indian financial year starts from 1st April to 31st March.
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consequential effects on transfer spending.7
Table 1 summarizes the ten major rural development programs that we study. The
programs considered in our study can broadly be categorized as subsidy or public work-
fare schemes. As can be seen, workfare schemes form the majority of the programs. The
primary objective of these programs is to provide an alternative source of income and
employment for the population living at or below the poverty line. Subsidy programs
like Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) and Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar
Yojana (SGSY) provide credit and subsidy to individuals (or a group of individuals)
in order to promote self-employment and investment in income generating assets. In-
dira Awaas Yojana (IAY) provides 100% subsidy to below poverty line households for
self-construction of basic dwelling units also known as kutcha houses. The table also in-
dicates whether a program was implemented in steps. Usually, programs that are imple-
mented in phases take two (or more) years to achieve complete coverage in all the dis-
tricts of the country. The table also shows if a program substituted any older scheme(s)
with similar objectives. For example, Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) in 1989 was a re-
placement for the two previous public workfare programs: National Rural Employment
Program (NREP) and Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Program (RLEGP).
Since these programs are centrally sponsored schemes, most (≈ 80%) of the pro-
gram cost is borne by the central government while the state governments contribute
only towards some specific components of the programs. In practice, however, almost
all of the program expenditure is financed by the central government. The last column
of Table 1 shows the average annual expenditure (in 2004 prices) incurred under each
program at the national level.
The following are a few salient features of the programs we study. First, all the
programs only cover the rural blocks or regions in a state. Second, the workfare pro-
grams provide manual labor work under public works like soil and water conservation
projects, afforestation, irrigation projects, etc. Since the overriding priority is direct
assistance to the rural poor, these programs do not undertake any heavy rural infrastruc-
ture projects like building of dams, bridges, and roads. Similarly, these programs do
not involve the creation of any marketable goods or services. Third, while the criteria
of fund allocation from the central government to the states may vary depending on the
program, the ratio of the rural poor in a state to the total rural poor in the country is
a key determinant in the fund allocation process for many programs. The states then
further disburse the funds at the district level based on program specific criteria.
7Expenditure under these programs can largely be classified as transfers as these schemes aim to
provide income support to the poorest and the most backward section of the rural population through
subsidies or employment at minimum wages through public works.
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2.3 Identifying Motivation
We use our narrative sources to identify the motivation behind the introduction of the
programs we study. We find that a new program either replaces old program(s) or is
introduced as a standalone scheme to function in addition to the existing schemes. We
note that old programs are restructured into a new scheme in order to address their
shortcomings and inefficiencies identified over the years. Also, a restructured scheme
is usually implemented with substantially larger outlay in funds. On the other hand, a
standalone scheme is introduced to achieve a social or economic objective that has not
been sufficiently addressed by any existing program. Either way, the introduction of
a new program is not output or growth motivated. On the contrary, the Annual Plan
of Ministry of Rural Development (1994-95, p. 245) notes: “. . . to the extent that the
growth process will ‘bypass’ certain sections of the rural society, it will be necessary
to provide supplementary employment and incomes via special programs”. We exploit
the independence between new program introductions at the national level and local
recessionary shocks to construct a series of spending innovations at the state level.
2.4 Identifying the Size, Timing, and Duration of the Shocks
We rely on the state-level heterogeneity in program implementation during the intro-
ductory period – which we refer as the “introductory variation” – to construct the “nar-
rative shock series”. The introductory period is mostly limited only to the year in which
a new program is introduced. Only for Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Pro-
gram (RLEGP) and National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), the intro-
ductory period is two years since these programs were implemented in a phase-wise
manner. Since state-wise expenditure data for IRDP is not available before 1985, the
introduction of IRDP in 1978 does not contribute to our shock series.8 To calculate the
introductory variation for a program, we calculate the year-on-year change in real per
capita program expenditure that occurs due to the introduction of the new scheme. If
the new program replaces older program(s), then the introductory variation is simply
the new program expenditure minus the total expenditure incurred under the previous
program(s) in the last year. If the new scheme is instead implemented as a standalone
program to further intensify transfer spending in rural areas, we take the whole first-year
expenditure as the introductory variation. If the program is implemented in phases, we
calculate the sequence of expenditure effects for each year.
We apply these criteria for all program introductions in the period 1980-2010 to
8We still include IRDP in our measure of total rural transfer spending (from 1985) since it was a
major development program of its time.
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construct the narrative shock series at the state-level that we use to estimate the local
multipliers. Since the decision to implement a new program (restructured or standalone)
is not systematically related to state-level macroeconomic shocks, we use this evidence
to rule out reverse causality from state-year shocks to changes in state-level spending
that occur during the implementation of a new program. As a robustness check, we
test (below) whether our constructed shock series is sensitive to contemporaneous or
lagged variations in agricultural output at the state-level. An immediate concern is that
the multiplier estimates obtained from this shock series can still be downward biased if
the increase in spending during program introductions is systematically large for states
that do poorly relative to other states.
For example, our narrative records cite the ratio of rural poor in the state to the
total rural poor in the country as a key factor that determines fund allocation to the
states under most of the programs. However, we show that in per capita terms, the
change in transfer spending due to a new program introduction is not correlated with
this backwardness index.
Similarly, we find that our multiplier estimates are essentially the same even after
excluding state fixed effects from our empirical model. This suggests that our narrative
shock series is largely orthogonal to state-specific characteristics. These findings are in
agreement with recent studies that also conclude that variation in program implementa-
tion can mostly be attributed to supply driven idiosyncratic factors like the political will
and administrative capabilities to implement a new scheme. Imbert and Papp (2014)
show that a host of district characteristics like the rate of literacy, poverty rate, agri-
cultural productivity, the level of wages, local elections, along with other worker level
controls are unable to account for the stark differences in the level of employment provi-
sion across districts under NREGA. Similarly, due to the rationing of demand for work
under NREGA, Dutta et al. (2012) find the number of NREGA days generated to be
only weakly correlated with poverty.
While we consider changes in the state-level transfer spending due to a new program
introduction as independent of local output fluctuations, we make no such assumption
regarding the broader measure of changes in state-level transfer spending. This is so
since once a program is well integrated into the system, expenditure under the program
can be sensitive to cyclical fluctuations in local economic conditions. These broader
measures of transfer changes like the year-on-year growth in total transfer spending
may contain many observations that are likely to be endogenous. In section 4, we
compare the multiplier estimates obtained through the narrative shock series with those
obtained from the broader measure of changes in transfer spending.
Below we discuss a detailed analysis of the motivation, timing, and the expenditure
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effects of (i) a standalone scheme that was implemented in phases; and (ii) a scheme
that qualifies as a restructured scheme. The appendix on the narrative analysis provides
a detailed discussion for the rest of the programs considered in our analysis.9 For a
state i in year t, we express the exogenous change in real per capita transfer spending
as ∆si,t and use Xi,t to denote real per capita expenditure under the program ‘X’ where
X ∈ {RLEGP, IAY}. For the ease of reference, any expenditure estimates that are cited
while discussing the programs are the same as mentioned in the narrative sources (in
nominal prices). All expenditure estimates used in the empirical analysis, however, are
converted to 2004 prices. We use the state GDP deflator series to allow for differential
price trends among states.
Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Program (RLEGP)
Implemented: 1983; Until: 1988
Program expenditure at the national level:
1983: |0.27 billion (2004 prices)
1984: |14.99 billion (2004 prices)
Exogenous change in state-level transfers:
∆si,1983: RLEGPi,1983
∆si,1984: RLEGPi,1984−RLEGPi,1983
RLEGP was launched in different states/union territories on 15th October 1983. Al-
though several anti-poverty programs were in place for the poor at the time, RLEGP
was specifically launched to address the problem of unemployment for the landless
laborers during the lean agricultural season. As the Annual Report 1983-84 of the Min-
istry of Rural Development states “the hardcore of rural poverty, particularly pertaining
to employment opportunities for the landless during the lean agricultural periods . . . has
to be tackled in a more direct and specific manner” (p. 41). The program’s objectives
were: (i) to provide up to 100 days of employment per year to at least one member
of every landless labor household and (ii) to create durable assets to strengthen rural
infrastructure. The program was fully funded by the central government.
Construction of rural link road, land development, and soil and water conservation
9Employment Assurance Scheme (1993) is the only program whose introduction is not treated as
exogenous. This is so since EAS was implemented as a demand-based scheme with no fixed allocations
to state. See Appendix 1.B for details.
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projects (among others) were allowed under RLEGP with the restriction that “the wage
component in a project should . . . not be less than 50% of the total cost of the project”
(p. 42). Since the program was introduced in the second half of the financial year 1983-
84, it was implemented in only 13 (out of the 25) Indian states and was later extended
to cover the rest of the states by 1984-85. During the first year, around |1 billion were
allocated for RLEGP out of which only |62 million were spent, possibly indicating
capacity and supply side constraints. However, expansion of the program in the follow-
ing year along with delivery mechanisms set in place, resulted in program expenditure
of |3.7 billion (out of the |4 billion that were made available). Since the motivation
to introduce the program was unrelated to current or prospective output fluctuations,
the resulting changes in transfer spending during the first two years of program imple-
mentation and expansion are regarded as exogenous variation in transfer spending. As
RLEGP did not substitute any older program, it is treated as a standalone scheme where
the program expenditure at the state-level during the year of implementation is regarded
as the exogenous change in transfer spending. Moreover, since there is evidence that the
program expanded substantially during 1984-85, the increase in program expenditure
in 1984 is also considered as exogenous introductory variation.
Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY)
Implemented: 1995; Until: Present
Program expenditure at the national level:
1995: |17.60 billion (2004 prices)
Exogenous change in state-level transfers:
∆si,1995: IAYi,1995− IAYi,1994
The Annual Report 1995-96 of the Ministry of Rural Development notes:
“The Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY) was launched in 1985-86 as a sub scheme
of Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Program to provide houses free
of cost to the members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, and freed
bonded laborers in rural areas. From 1989-90, the scheme has continued as
a sub-scheme of Jawahar Rozgar Yojana. In the beginning, 6 per cent of the
total allocation of the JRY was earmarked for the scheme. From 1993-94
. . . the JRY allocation for the implementation of IAY was raised from 6 per
12
cent to 10 per cent . . . From 1 January 1996 the Indira Awaas Yojana has
been taken out of JRY and made an independent scheme by itself” (p. 20).
In order to effectively target the mutually exclusive objectives of rural employment
and rural housing, IAY was implemented as an independent scheme in the financial year
1995-96. Around 75-80% of the program cost is financed by the central government.
State poverty ratio and the shortage in rural housing are the prime determinants in the
allocation of funds from the central government to the states. As a result of being
implemented as an independent scheme, expenditure under IAY increased to around
|12 billion in 1995-96, substantially higher than ≈ |5 billion that was spent under
IAY as a sub-scheme of JRY in 1994-95 (Annual Report 1998-99, Ministry of Rural
Development). Hence, the exogenous implementation variation for the year 1995-96
is calculated as the difference between IAY expenditure in 1995-96 and 1994-95. The
challenge in calculating the state-wise exogenous variation due to IAY implementation
is that state-wise data for IAY is only reported from 1995-96. Expenditure under IAY
is not available at the state level when it was implemented as a sub-scheme of JRY.
To overcome this constraint, we approximate the state-wise expenditure under IAY in
1994-95 using: (i) state-wise expenditure data under JRY; and (ii) the allocation criteria
which required 10% of JRY funds to be earmarked for IAY. Using this approximation,
we calculate the difference in IAY expenditure between 1995-96 and 1994-95: IAY1995
− IAY1994 as the exogenous introductory variation in transfer spending. Since there is
no evidence to suggest that Indira Awaas Yojana underwent any expansion in terms of
coverage after 1995-96, exogenous variation is limited to the year IAY was introduced
as an independent scheme.
2.5 Narrative Shock Series
We now discuss the result of our narrative analysis which gives us a measure of state-
wise transfer changes that are largely exogenous to local output fluctuations. We also
compare this shock series with the broader measure of changes in total rural transfer
spending. Finally, we discuss the properties of our narrative shock series before using it
to estimate the state-sector multipliers. As explained above, our narrative shock series
can be expressed as the change in real per capita transfer spending for state i in year t –
∆si,t – due to program introductions. We normalize these exogenous changes in transfer
spending with lagged real per capita agricultural output at the state level. We define
the broader measure of transfer changes as the year-on-year change in real per capita
total rural transfer spending, also normalized with lagged real per capita agricultural
output at the state level. Below we refer the exogenous changes in transfer spending
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Figure 2: Aggregate Annual Variations in Rural Transfer Spending
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as a percent of lagged agricultural output simply as exogenous changes. Similarly, the
broader measure of year-on-year changes in total rural transfer spending divided by
lagged agricultural output is often referred as all changes.10
Figure 2 shows the broader measure of year-on-year changes in total rural transfer
spending as a percent of previous year’s state agricultural output for the period 1981-
2010. As the figure shows, there are large increases in transfer spending in nearly all
the states during 2008 and 2009. While a large part of this increase can be attributed
to the scale up of NREGA, the period between 2008 and 2009 also witnessed a peak in
loan waivers, subsidies, and a fiscal stimulus package that followed the financial crisis.
Hence, part of the increase in transfer spending during 2008-09 may be a discretionary
counter-cyclical policy response.11
Figure 3 shows our narrative shock series: the state-wise exogenous changes in
transfer spending as a percent of state agricultural output for the period 1981-2010.
As can be seen from Figure 3, the shock series mostly takes the value zero except for
the exogenous impulses that correspond to the introductory variation due to program
introductions. The mean of the shock series (across states and time) is 0.12 percent of
state agricultural GDP with a standard deviation of 0.51 percent. A substantial number
of exogenous changes are above 1⁄2 percent of state agricultural GDP with a maximum
value of 6 percent.
10Total rural transfer spending is defined at the beginning of section 2.
11This is why we limit the introductory period of NREGA implementation to 2006 and 2007, even
though the complete implementation of the program took three years. See Appendix 1.B for details.
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Figure 3: Exogenous Changes in Rural Transfer Spending
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2.6 Properties of Exogenous Transfer Changes
Next, we discuss some properties of the narrative shock series. First, we test for serial
correlation in the shock series by conducting the Wooldridge (2002) test for linear panel
data models. The test checks for serial correlation among the residuals εi,t obtained from
the first difference estimation of the following model
Si,t = γt +αi + εi,t i ∈ {1,2, . . .23}, t ∈ {1981, . . . ,2010} (1)
where Si,t = ∆si,t/yi,t−1 is the exogenous change in real per capita transfer spending
in state i in year t divided by the lagged real per capita agricultural output in the same
state. We find no evidence of serial correlation in the spending innovations identified
through narrative analysis. The null of no serial correlation cannot be rejected at a p-
value of 0.29. Figure 4 shows the scatter plot of εi,t – as obtained from a regression of
Equation 1 – on its lag. As can be seen, the shock series is largely orthogonal to its lag
and the slope of correlation is very flat and not statistically different from zero. This is
evidence against the hypothesis that expenditure variations at state-level that occur due
to program introductions are serially correlated and hence predictable using previous
shocks.
Second, we check whether the exogenous changes in transfer spending are system-
atically correlated with the ratio of rural poor in the state to the total rural poor in the
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Figure 4: Serial Correlation of Narrative Shocks
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country. As discussed earlier, the state poverty ratio is a key determinant in the alloc-
ation of funds from the central government to the states for many programs. However,
we find a statistically insignificant correlation of 0.07 between our shock series and the
rural poverty ratio. This supports our premise that the heterogeneity in transfer spend-
ing during program introductions is largely due to idiosyncratic supply factors and not
due to state characteristics that are likely to be correlated with local output. This is fur-
ther confirmed by our results which are largely invariant to the exclusion of state fixed
effects (discussed in section 5).
A natural concern in our study is that although the stated political motivation of
the introduction of a new program seems independent of output fluctuations or factors
influencing output, it might not truly be so. Since these programs are largely agriculture-
centric, a few consecutive bad harvest years may influence the introduction of a new
program as an additional safety net for the rural poor and unemployed. If this is the
case, then changes in transfer spending are not truly exogenous and are predictable
using such serially correlated shocks to the local output. We take lagged changes in
agricultural output as a proxy to such serially correlated shocks that can impact the
rural economy and use them to study if they can predict our measure of exogenous
16
transfer spending.
We regress the real per capita exogenous changes in rural transfer spending at state-
level on contemporaneous and three lags of year-on-year growth in real per capita state
agricultural GDP, along with the state and year fixed effects. All the coefficients of
lagged changes in real agricultural output are zero up to two decimal places and are
insignificantly different from zero (p = 0.53). Similarly, as is discussed in the results
section, accounting for lagged changes in real agricultural output as additional controls
in our empirical model do not alter the results in any significant way.
2.7 Anticipation Effects
Systematic anticipation effects associated with the implementation of a new program
may spuriously raise (or lower) the multiplier estimates. Ramey (2011) for example
shows that both the narrative shocks and the professional forecasts (in US) Granger-
cause the VAR errors. Anticipation effects, however, may not be a concern in our study
for the following reasons. First, there is often a significant revision in the expenditure
estimates by the government where these revisions often take many months to complete.
This suggests that the information set of the implementing authority is itself incomplete.
Consequently, it is extremely unlikely that the information set of the private sector prior
to the spending shocks is better than that of the government after the shocks - a point
also stressed by Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013) for developing economies.
Secondly, the target group - the rural poor, faces severe informational constraints
regarding such programs and about the complete list of benefits that can be availed
under such programs. As a response to alleviate such informational constraints, the
government organizes various outreach activities after a new program has been imple-
mented. Hence apart from being severely liquidity constrained, the target group is also
informationally constrained. Therefore, there is little reason to expect any systematic
anticipatory response by the transfer beneficiaries before the implementation of a new
program.12
3 Empirical Model
We estimate the state-sector multiplier using data on agricultural output and transfer
spending shock series for 23 states of India over the thirty-year span between 1980 and
12Kaplan and Violante (2014) show that even wealthy households optimally choose to hold little liquid
wealth and hence show large propensities to consume out of transitory income while the response to the
news of future income is small. In comparison, the target group in our study is extremely poor, which
further alleviates concerns for any systematic anticipation effects.
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2010. Therefore, we have 690 annual observations. Let yi,t denote the real per capita
agricultural output for state i in year t, and Yi,t = (yi,t − yi,t−1)/yi,t−1 its rate of growth.
Si,t , as defined in Equation 1, is the year-on-year exogenous change in real per capita
transfer spending divided by the lagged real per capita agricultural output. Consistent
with the recent literature (see for e.g., Barro and Redlick, 2011; Acconcia, Corsetti, and
Simonelli, 2014) we estimate spending multiplier by relating agriculture output growth
(Yi,t) to the year-on-year exogenous change in transfer spending in the same state (Si,t).
Our empirical model is
Yi,t =
3
∑
j=0
β jSi,t− j +
3
∑
j=1
ξ jYi,t− j +αi + γt + ri,t + εi,t (2)
where β0 estimates the impact multiplier while the coefficients on the three lags
of the shock variable Si,t provide estimates of the dynamic multipliers. State and year
fixed effects are denoted by αi and γt respectively; ri,t is the number of rural poor in the
state as a percent of total rural poor in the country. Through the state fixed effects we
account for possible endogeneity issues emanating from any state-specific trends that
may influence fund allocation from the central government. For example, if per capita
expenditure is higher for states with low average agricultural growth, then the omission
of state-specific trends may downward bias our estimates.
The year fixed effects control for aggregate annual variations that are common to
all the states. This may include fiscal, monetary, trade, and agricultural policy at the
national level.13 The year fixed effects also control for changes at the national level
during a year that may impact agricultural output in all the states. New technology
adoption at the country level or the aggregate monsoon performance, for example, is
controlled by the year fixed effects. Failure to account for such aggregate variations may
spuriously result in higher (or lower) multiplier estimates. A key advantage specific
to our data is that while most of the spending under these programs comes from the
central government, on the taxation side, the local state governments have very limited
power to change tax rates. According to the Article 246 of The Constitution of India,
the parliament has the exclusive power to make laws on income tax, corporation tax,
customs, and excise.14 Therefore, the state-level variation in transfer spending due to
a new program is not matched by changes in tax burden for the local residents. Hence
specific to our study, omission of tax changes from our set of controls is unlikely to be
13See for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2012),
and Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013) among others for a discussion on the sensitivity of the multiplier
estimates to fiscal-monetary policy mix and to the degree of openness of the economy.
14List II and III of Article 246 enumerates the areas in which only the state or both the state and the
parliament can make laws. However, this accounts for a very small proportion of the revenue component.
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a cause of concern since the year fixed effects control for the tax changes made at the
national level.15
To avoid misleading inference in panel estimation one has to control for any serial or
spatial correlation among observations (see for e.g., Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan,
2004; Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Regarding spatial correlation, we posit that states
in the same region may be correlated due to unobserved cluster effects like common
agricultural practices, natural resources, and weather conditions. Therefore, we use
standard errors that are robust to contemporaneous spatial correlation allowing for 240
clusters (i.e., 30 annual observations for 8 regions), and robust to heteroskedasticity as
well.16 Regarding serial correlation, we use three lags of the dependent variable Yi,t .
Including lags of agricultural output growth also helps us to control for a multitude
of other influences which affect Yi,t and are likely to be serially correlated. Further-
more, following Romer and Romer (2010), including lagged output growth accounts
for hidden motivation of seemingly exogenous policy changes. Specific to our case,
if seemingly exogenous program introductions are more common when agricultural
growth is below normal, then stimulatory effects of transfer spending would in part be
due to the agricultural growth returning back to normal. Accounting for lagged val-
ues of agricultural growth helps us to control for this possibility. It is worth noting
that the inclusion of lagged dependent variable in Equation 2 does not result in any
consequential dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981). We confirm this by comparing mul-
tiplier estimates obtained from the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimation
of Equation 2 with the bias-corrected estimator (LSDVC) (see Bruno, 2005 for details
and related literature). Both estimators yield the same parameter estimates up to two
decimal places.17 This is expected since the time dimension of our panel data is large.
For computational convenience, all our regressions use LSDV estimator.
4 Results
Corresponding to the estimates obtained in Equation 2, Table 2 summarizes the implied
effect of spending increase of one percent of state agricultural output on the path of
state agricultural GDP relative to normal. The table reports the impact and cumulative
15Acconcia, Corsetti, and Simonelli (2014) use similar characteristics of fiscal federalism in Italy in
their study to estimate government purchase multiplier.
16We group 23 states into 8 regions. For example, we group all north-eastern states like Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura in one region; the southern region
consists of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu and so on.
17For a macro panel like the one used in this study, Judson and Owen (1999) strongly advocate LSDVC
for bias correction. LSDVC estimation results are available on request.
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multipliers for up to 5 years denoted by M(t),M(t +1), . . . ,M(t +5). Columns 1-3 re-
port multipliers obtained using our narrative shock series. In Column 1, we compute
cumulative multipliers based on the impact and dynamic estimates obtained in Equa-
tion 2, without controlling for lagged output growth and state-country poverty ratios.
Because of the simple specification used in column 1, the cumulative effect after 2
years, for example, is simply the sum of the coefficients on the contemporaneous and
the first two lags of the spending variable. The impact multiplier for this specification
is estimated to be around 1.3 which is statistically different from zero at 5 percent sig-
nificance level. The cumulative effect of spending after three years grows to around
2.7, significant only at 10 percent level.18 However, there is clear evidence of negative
serial correlation among the regression residuals under this specification.19 While para-
meter estimates are still unbiased in the presence of serial correlation, negative serial
correlation may actually cause standard errors to be overestimated.
We next present results that control for lagged dependent variable as additional re-
gressors in column 2 of Table 2. The estimates in column 2 again show the implied
effect of transfer spending increase of 1 percent of state agricultural output on state ag-
ricultural GDP. However, the cumulative effect now not only includes the direct effect
of transfer spending but also accounts for the feedback effect from the lagged depend-
ent variable. That is, the dynamic effect on state agricultural GDP now also accounts
for implied change in the path of lagged output growth. Since accounting for lagged
dependent variable allows for the possibility of calculating effects of transfer spending
beyond 3 years, we simulate the effect on state agricultural output growth till 5 years.
Overall, the multiplier estimates reported in column 1 and 2 are very comparable
which is evidence against the possibility that the output response to spending innova-
tions simply reflects the normal dynamics of the agricultural economy. However, the
standard errors in column 2 are substantially smaller than those reported in column 1.
Hence, negative serial correlation does seem to overstate the standard errors in column
1 . We find no evidence of serial correlation after controlling for lagged dependent vari-
ables. The impact multiplier in column 2 is 1.4 which is highly significant (t > 2.6),
the effect after three years is 2.6 which reduces to 2.3 after 5 years (both estimates are
significant at 5 percent significance level).
Finally, column 3 estimates the impact and cumulative effect of transfer spending
after adding the state-country poverty ratios as additional controls in Equation 2. As
18Standard errors for the cumulative multipliers are estimated using the delta method (Oehlert, 1992).
19A regression of εi,t on its lag gives a coefficient of −0.4 which is highly significant (t > 10). As-
suming that error estimates follow a first-order autoregressive process: εi,t = ρεi,t +νi,t , we get the same
correlation estimate of ρ (of −0.4) using ρ = 1−dp/2 where dp is the generalized Durbin-Watson stat-
istic calculated for panel data as in Bhargava, Franzini, and Narendranathan (1982).
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Figure 5: Estimated Impact of a Transfer Increase of 1% of State Agricultural Output
on State Agricultural Output using Exogenous Changes
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can be seen, this changes the results only marginally. The impact multiplier is still 1.4
and highly significant (t > 2.6) while the overall effect of the spending increase after 3
years is 2.5 which reduces to 2.1 after 5 years (both estimates are significant at 5 percent
level). We treat the specification in column 3, which includes all the controls specified
in Equation 2 as our preferred specification. Corresponding to the estimates obtained in
column 3, Figure 5 summarizes the implied effect of an increase in transfer spending of
1 percent of the state agricultural output on the path of state agricultural output relative
to normal together with one standard error bands.
4.1 Comparison with Broader Measures
A key objective of this paper is to highlight the consequences of ignoring changes in
transfer spending that are correlated with local output fluctuations due to shocks like
droughts, floods, or other natural disasters. As a result, using a broader measure like
all changes in transfer spending can spuriously downward bias the multiplier estimates.
It is hence important to compare the results obtained from the narrative shock series
with those obtained from the broader measure of all changes in transfer spending. To
do this comparison, we substitute the exogenous changes in transfer spending (Si,t) in
Equation 2 with all changes: the year-on-year growth in total rural transfer spending
(as shown in Figure 2).
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Figure 6: Estimated Impact of a Transfer Increase of 1% of State Agricultural Output
on State Agricultural Output
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The last column of Table 2 shows the impact and cumulative multipliers obtained
from the broader measure of changes in transfer spending, controlling for all other re-
gressors as in our preferred specification. As can be seen, all of the estimates in column
4 are nearly an order of magnitude smaller than the respective estimates in column 3.
Figure 6 compares the impact and cumulative multipliers obtained using our narrat-
ive shock series with those obtained from the broader measure of changes in transfer
spending. As the figure shows, all estimates obtained using the broader measure are
insignificant from zero. The difference is significant to the extent that the whole confid-
ence interval that corresponds to the narrative shock series is almost always higher than
the confidence bounds obtained from the broader measure of changes in transfer spend-
ing. This comparison hence confirms that failure to address the endogeneity problem
can severely downward bias the multiplier estimates towards zero.
4.2 Robustness
While outliers and high leverage observations can be perfectly valid observations, it is
important to check the sensitivity of our results to such observations. For example, the
smallest (−44%) and the largest (139%) growth rates of the state agricultural output
respectively correspond to the financial years 1987-88 and 1988-89 for the state of
Gujarat. However, these extreme outliers are not data errors and instead correspond
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to the drought of 1987-88 in Gujarat that “affected more than 87% area of the state”
and “was the worst ever drought during 1973-74 to 2004-05” (p. 14, Roy and Hirway,
2007). An extreme drought followed by an average monsoon in the following year can
hence explain the two outliers.
We first estimate a robust regression of Equation 2 to check the robustness of our
results to outliers and high leverage points. The procedure initially screens out gross
outliers with Cook’s distance D > 1 followed by an iteration process to weigh each
observation based on Huber and biweights. Convergence is achieved when the max-
imum change in weights from one iteration to the next is below tolerance (see Li, 1985
for details). Table 3 reports the robust regression estimates of Equation 2 in column
2. For comparison, column 1 of Table 3 reports the baseline results from our preferred
specification in Table 2. As can be seen, robust regression yields very comparable es-
timates to the baseline results. The impact multiplier is estimated to be slightly lower at
1.3 which highly significant (t > 2.9). Similar to the baseline, the maximum cumulative
effect achieved after 3 years is 2.4 and it decreases to 2.1 after 5 years (t > 2.9 for both
estimates).
Next, we test for the robustness of our results to the exclusion of influential obser-
vations. We employ the DFITS statistic which measures the influence an observation
has on the overall fit of the model to identify influential observations (see Welsch and
Kuh, 1977). Column 3 of Table 3 shows results of estimating Equation 2 after exclud-
ing the identified influential points based on the DFITS statistics. The impact multiplier
using the DFITS statistics is 1.3 (t > 2.7), again very similar to the baseline result. The
cumulative effects of transfer spending from then on are consistently higher and more
significant than the corresponding baseline estimates. The overall multiplier after 5
years, for example, is estimated at 2.5 with t > 3. Hence while our results are robust to
outliers, high leverage points, and other influential observations, we have no compelling
reason to omit these observations from our analysis.
5 Extensions
In this section, we further analyze the properties of our model by first looking at the
cross-border and sectoral spillover effects of rural transfer spending. Next, we test
the implications of restricting our model to spending under employment guarantee
schemes. Finally, we test the heterogeneity of our estimates across macro areas and
also check the influence of state and year dummies.
23
5.1 Spillover Effects
We first test whether there are any cross-border effects of spending under these pro-
grams. For example, an increase in transfer spending in a state may spur economic
activity in adjacent states due to demand leakages. On the other hand, if higher spend-
ing under such programs results in the relocation of factors of production from the
neighboring states, then an increase in agricultural growth rate in one state may neg-
atively affect the agriculture sector in an adjacent state. If either type of spillover is
empirically relevant, then our baseline results will confound the local output effects of
transfer spending with demand leakage or relocation effect. Following Acconcia, Cor-
setti, and Simonelli (2014), we test the cross-border effects by controlling for regional
spending in our model. Therefore, we estimate the following model
Yi,t =
3
∑
j=0
β jSi,t− j +
3
∑
j=1
ξ jYi,t− j +
1
∑
j=0
ζ jSRi,t− j +αi + γt + ri,t + εi,t (3)
which is the same as Equation 2 but with SRi,t and its lags as additional controls. We
define SRi,t =∆sri,t/syi,t−1 where ∆sri,t is the aggregate year-on-year exogenous change
in real per capita transfer spending in the states that belong to the same region as the
state i, excluding the state i itself; syi,t−1 is the lagged real per capita agricultural output
of the region defined accordingly. Although estimation of Equation 3 yields coefficients
of SRi,t and its lag to be below zero, both coefficients are insignificant from zero (t < 1).
Column 2 of Table 4 shows the impact and cumulative multipliers computed from the
estimates of Equation 3. The results are slightly higher but always comparable to the
baseline results.
Column 3 reports the computed multipliers after adding the interaction term Si,t ×
SRi,t to Equation 3, where both the variables are expressed in deviations from their re-
spective mean value. By controlling for this interaction term, we check whether the
effect of local spending reflects complementarity due to demand leakages or substi-
tutability due to the relocation of factors of production. However, the coefficient on
the interaction term is estimated to be only 0.1 which is statistically indistinguishable
from zero (p-value = 0.8). The computed multipliers are again comparable but slightly
higher than the baseline results. Finally, column 4 shows the results computed from the
estimates of Equation 2 but after aggregating small states with adjacent states, thereby
reducing the total number of states in our sample from 23 to 16. This increases the im-
pact multiplier to around 1.7 but the overall impact after five years is 2.3, comparable to
the corresponding baseline result of 2.1. Overall, the evidence from these tests suggests
weak spillover effects.
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Next, we discuss the sectoral spillover effects of local spending within a state. De-
mand leakages or relocation of factors of production to other sectors within a state
are equally relevant issues that need to be examined in order to understand the local
economic effects of spending under rural programs. If higher rural transfer spending
results in a higher demand for products and services from sectors other than the agri-
culture sector, then this will result in positive spillover effects. On the other hand, if
higher growth in agriculture sector crowds out factors of production from other sectors
into the agricultural sector, then this will result in negative spillovers. To estimate such
spillover effects, we estimate Equation 4 which is the same as Equation 2 except that the
dependent variable: Y si,t is now the growth rate of real per capita state output while the
transfer shock series Ss is the year-on-year exogenous change in real per capita transfer
spending due to program introductions normalized by the lagged real per capita state
GDP.
Y si,t =
3
∑
j=0
β jSsi,t− j +
3
∑
j=1
ξ jY si,t− j +αi + γt + ri,t + εi,t (4)
A tradeoff of normalizing exogenous spending changes by the state GDP is that the
spending innovations are significantly smaller relative to aggregate state output than
they are to state agricultural output. The mean of the transfer shock series normalized
by the state output is just 0.03 percent of state GDP with a standard deviation of 0.13
percent of state GDP. Most of the spending shocks normalized by the state GDP are on
average 3-4 times smaller than the respective shocks normalized by the state agricultural
output. As a result of this aggregation, we expect a loss of power in determining the
true sign and magnitude of the effect that transfer spending will have on state output.
Figure 7 shows the cumulative effect of a 1% (of state GDP) increase in rural transfer
spending on state GDP relative to normal. The point estimate corresponding to the
transfer spending shock is close to zero on impact while the cumulative effect grows to
1.7 after 5 years.
As expected, the standard errors corresponding to the multiplier estimates are ap-
proximately 2-3 times larger than those obtained in our baseline results. Consequently,
the estimated effect of rural transfer spending on state output is never significantly dif-
ferent from zero. In fact, as the figure shows, the confidence bands of the state output
multipliers almost always envelope the confidence interval of the state-sector multipli-
ers. Table 5 compares the state output multipliers obtained using the narrative shocks
series versus when the broader measure of changes in transfer spending is normalized
by the state GDP. Like in section 4, there appears to be a substantial downward bias in
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Figure 7: Comparing Transfer Spending Shock Normalized by State GDP and State
Agricultural GDP
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the computed multipliers, none of which are statistically different from zero.
Overall, while there appears to be no significant effect of spending innovations on
the aggregate state output, the confidence intervals in this test are large enough to ac-
commodate our baseline results. Hence, we do not find any concrete evidence of pos-
itive or negative sectoral spillover effects within a state. Apart from the issues of large
standard errors and low power of tests, such an aggregation is relevant only if innova-
tions in rural transfers are representative of innovations in statewide transfers.
5.2 Effect of Spending under Employment Schemes
Up till now, we have analyzed the multiplicative output effects of spending under all
major rural development programs in India between 1980 and 2010. However, from
a policy perspective, it is important to check for heterogeneity in the output response
to different kinds of development programs. Accordingly, in this section, we calcu-
late the state-sector multipliers due to programs that can be categorized as employment
schemes. As is noted in section 2, employment schemes form the majority of the pro-
grams that we study. We refer to spending on these programs as employment spending.
Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively show: i) the broader measure of year-on-year
changes in total employment spending, and ii) the exogenous changes in employment
spending, both taken as a percent of lagged state agricultural output. Both measures
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are constructed exactly like in section 2, but exclusively for employment schemes. For
example, the narrative shock series in Figure 9 is exactly the same as the one shown
in Figure 3 except for the following changes. First, the year 1995 does not have any
spending innovations due to the introduction of a housing subsidy scheme IAY.
Figure 8: Aggregate Annual Variations in Transfer Spending with Only Employment
Generation Programs
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Second, the exogenous variation in 1999 is only due to the introduction of JGSY
(employment scheme) while we ignore the changes in spending that occurred due to the
introduction of a credit-cum-subsidy scheme SGSY that was also implemented in the
same year (to replace IRDP). Column 1 of Table 6 shows the impact and cumulative
multipliers computed under our preferred specification with the exogenous changes in
employment spending as shown in Figure 9.
The results are highly comparable to our baseline results. The impact multiplier is
estimated to be around 1.5 (t > 2.96) which grows to around 2.2 (significant at standard
confidence levels) after five years. Column 2 of Table 6 shows the results from the
broader measure of changes in employment spending. Not surprisingly and consistent
with our results in section 4, multiplier estimates obtained from this broader measure of
changes in employment spending are substantially downward biased towards zero (and
insignificant).
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Figure 9: Exogenous Transfer Spending with Only Employment Generation Programs
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5.3 Influence of Regions, Time, and State-Specific Dummies
In Table 7, we test the implications of excluding cluster of states based on geographic
locations and dropping the year and state fixed effects. We respectively drop the states
that belong to the northern, southern, and central India in the columns named “Drop
North”, “Drop South”, and “Drop Center” as a way to test the heterogeneity in our
results across macro areas. Next, we drop the year fixed effects to understand how
our baseline results change when we allow the multiplier estimates to be influenced
by national fiscal, monetary, and agricultural policies along with aggregate cyclical
fluctuations. Similarly, we drop the state fixed effects to see the extent to which cross-
sectional effects impinge on our results. While dropping states from the northern and
central regions yield slightly higher impact multipliers of 1.5 and 1.7 respectively, ex-
cluding the southern states from the sample yield an impact multiplier that is a bit lower
at 1. However, the aggregate effect after 5 years in all three cases is very close to the
baseline estimate of 2.1 (all significant at 5 percent confidence level). In column 4,
excluding the year fixed effects yield a slightly higher impact multiplier of 1.7 which
reaches a maximum of 1.8 after three years before declining to around 1.6 after five
years. Dropping the state fixed effects in the last column yield an impact multiplier of
around 1.2 with cumulative multipliers of around 2 and 1.8 after 3 and 5 years respect-
ively (all significant at 5 percent confidence level). Given that our results are robust to
the exclusion of state fixed effects is encouraging and lends support to our identification
strategy that assumes the narrative shock series to be largely orthogonal to state charac-
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teristics. In conclusion, none of the tests produce results that are significantly different
from our baseline estimates.
6 Conclusions
This paper exploits the state-level variation in transfer spending associated with the
implementation of new welfare schemes in India to estimate the effect of government
transfers on state agricultural output. Using official records as narrative evidence, we
identify local variations in transfer spending that are largely independent of current or
prospective fluctuations in local output to estimate the “state-sector multiplier”. We
estimate the multiplier to be 1.4 on impact which increases to 2.1 after five years. Com-
parison with a broader measure of changes in transfer spending yields multiplier es-
timates that are an order of magnitude smaller than those obtained from our narrative
shock series. Thus, failure to disentangle the cyclical fluctuations in transfer spending
can substantially downward bias the output effects of government transfers.
The study has important policy implications. First, the multiplier estimates suggest
that welfare schemes can be an effective fiscal tool to address local area or sector spe-
cific downturns, where the local adjustment in spending can be achieved mainly through
redistribution of resources. Given that we do not find any relevant regional or sectoral
spillover effects, the local gains from temporary variations in transfer spending seem to
be quite insular. Second, cuts in transfer spending at the aggregate level (in times of
crisis) can lead to large variations in the extent of retrenchment at the local level. Our
estimates suggest that differences in the intensity of contraction at the local level may
result in significant variation in the local economic activity.
Our results are largely comparable to the recent and growing literature that uses
sub-national data to report greater than one spending multipliers (Acconcia, Corsetti,
and Simonelli, 2014, Chodorow-Reich et al., 2012; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014;
Fishback and Kachanovskaya, 2010; Serrato and Wingender, 2010; Shoag, 2010). In
a recent paper, Giambattista and Pennings (2016) report that conditional on monetary
accommodation of the inflation generated by transfer spending, transfer multipliers can
be as large as purchase multipliers. In that respect, our study provides indirect evidence
that transfer and purchase multipliers can indeed be very comparable in studies using
sub-national data where aggregate tax and monetary policy interactions are controlled
by the year fixed effects.
It is worth noting that while our estimates are overwhelmingly significant, the con-
fidence intervals are nonetheless substantial. Hence, when we ask narrower questions
like whether the multipliers are significantly greater than unity, the confidence bands
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are generally quite wide. We have also been largely silent on whether the output expan-
sion is due to the supply or demand side factors. While the sizeable impact multiplier
suggests a demand stimulus, transfer spending can also boost investment (and hence
output) by alleviating liquidity constraints. This can be especially relevant for small
and marginal farmers. The growing and persistent positive effect on output may also
reflect increases in agricultural productivity. A promising area for future work can be to
analyze the general equilibrium labor market effects of employment guarantee schemes
that may facilitate a better understanding of how such anti-poverty programs affect the
local economic activity.
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Tables
Table 1: Major Rural Development Programs Since 1980
Program Years Active
Type of
Replaced
Phase-wise Average
Program Roll-out Expenditure
IRDP 1978-1998
Credit &
None Yes |17.64 Billion
Subsidy
NREP 1980-1988
Public
None No |19.07 Billion
Workfare
RLEGP 1983-1988
Public
None Yes |15.71 Billion
Workfare
JRY 1989-1998
Public NREP &
No |54.05 Billion
Workfare RLEGP
EAS 1993-2000
Public
None Yes |27.37 Billion
Workfare
IAY 1995-Present
Housing
None† No |37.82 BillionSubsidy
SGSY 1999-Present
Credit &
IRDP No |13.99 Billion
Subsidy
JGSY 1999-2000
Public
JRY No |35.83 Billion
Workfare
SGRY 2001-2007
Public EAS &
No |48.91 Billion
Workfare JRY
NREGA 2006-Present
Public
SGRY‡ Yes |190.21 BillionWorkfare
Notes: The table shows all major rural development programs in India that were operational
between 1980 and 2010. IRDP: Integrated Rural Development Program; NREP: National Rural
Employment Program; RLEGP: Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Program; JRY: Jawa-
har Rozgar Yojana; EAS: Employment Assurance Scheme; IAY: Indira Awaas Yojana; SGSY:
Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana; JGSY: Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana; SGRY: Sampoorna
Grameen Rozgar Yojana; NREGA: National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. Average expendit-
ure for a program is the aggregate national expenditure incurred under the program from program
inception to the last year of the program divided by the number of years the program was active. The
expenditure is expressed in 2004 prices using state GDP deflator. Data for IRDP is available from
1985 (average is calculated for 14 years). † Indira Awaas Yojana existed as a sub-scheme of Jawahar
Rozgar Yojana (JRY) until 1994. ‡ SGRY was operational during the first two years of NREGA.
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Table 2: Cumulative Multipliers
Exogenous Changes All Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
M(t) 1.323∗∗ 1.402∗∗∗ 1.361∗∗∗ -0.088
[0.631] [0.527] [0.521] [0.334]
M(t +1) 1.479 1.417∗ 1.352∗ 0.222
[0.929] [0.783] [0.803] [0.396]
M(t +2) 2.169∗ 2.106∗∗ 2.009∗∗ 0.319
[1.284] [0.913] [0.929] [0.476]
M(t +3) 2.669∗ 2.612∗∗ 2.486∗∗ 0.188
[1.612] [1.111] [1.152] [0.900]
M(t +4) 2.284∗∗∗ 2.180∗∗ 0.176
[0.849] [0.886] [0.578]
M(t +5) 2.231∗∗∗ 2.127∗∗ 0.181
[0.857] [0.900] [0.618]
Poverty Ratios No No Yes Yes
Lags of Y No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 621 621 621 621
Notes: Data is annual from 1980 to 2010 at the state-level. The table reports the im-
plied effect of transfer spending increase of 1% real per capita agricultural GDP on the
path of real per capita agricultural GDP relative to normal using estimates from Equa-
tion 2. The dependent variable in all the regressions is Yi,t : the year-on-year percentage
change in real per capita agricultural output. Columns 1 to 3 report multipliers using the
exogenous changes in real per capita transfer spending taken as a percentage of previ-
ous year’s real per capita agricultural GDP. The fourth column reports multipliers using
the broader measure of all changes in real per capita total transfer spending taken as a
percentage of previous year’s real per capita agricultural output. All regressions include
state and year fixed effects. The standard errors clustered at the region × year level and
robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in square brackets (the standard errors for cu-
mulative multipliers M(t +1), . . . ,M(t +5) are calculated from the variance-covariance
matrix of the corresponding structural specification using the delta method).
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3: Robustness
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Robust DFITS
M(t) 1.361∗∗∗ 1.265∗∗∗ 1.316∗∗∗
[0.521] [0.425] [0.481]
M(t +1) 1.352∗ 1.318∗ 1.467∗∗
[0.803] [0.676] [0.729]
M(t +2) 2.009∗∗ 2.155∗∗∗ 2.412∗∗∗
[0.929] [0.752] [0.826]
M(t +3) 2.486∗∗ 2.380∗∗∗ 2.853∗∗∗
[1.152] [0.855] [0.988]
M(t +4) 2.180∗∗ 2.236∗∗∗ 2.569∗∗∗
[0.886] [0.744] [0.813]
M(t +5) 2.127∗∗ 2.135∗∗∗ 2.455∗∗∗
[0.900] [0.731] [0.807]
Poverty Ratios Yes Yes Yes
Lags of Y Yes Yes Yes
Observations 621 609 591
Notes: The dependent variable in all the regressions is the year-on-
year percentage change in real per capita agricultural output. All
regressions include state and year fixed effects. All regressions in-
clude state and year fixed effects. The standard errors clustered at
the region × year level and robust to heteroskedasticity are reported
in square brackets.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4: Cross Border Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Spill-over1 Spill-over2 Aggregate
M(t) 1.361∗∗∗ 1.605∗∗∗ 1.489∗ 1.647∗∗
[0.521] [0.538] [0.819] [0.720]
M(t +1) 1.352∗ 1.803∗∗ 1.748∗∗ 1.539
[0.803] [0.730] [0.768] [0.996]
M(t +2) 2.009∗∗ 2.393∗∗ 2.325∗∗ 2.213∗∗
[0.929] [0.940] [0.984] [1.010]
M(t +3) 2.486∗∗ 2.810∗∗ 2.763∗∗ 2.670∗∗
[1.152] [1.150] [1.165] [1.115]
M(t +4) 2.180∗∗ 2.501∗∗∗ 2.435∗∗ 2.345∗∗∗
[0.886] [0.902] [0.949] [0.862]
M(t +5) 2.127∗∗ 2.470∗∗∗ 2.412∗∗ 2.272∗∗
[0.900] [0.905] [0.938] [0.908]
SRi,t− j|1j=0 No Yes Yes No
SRi,t×Si,t No No Yes No
Lags of Y Yes Yes Yes Yes
Poverty Ratios Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 621 621 621 432
Notes: The dependent variable in all the regressions is the year-on-year percentage
change in real per capita agricultural output. Column 1 shows the baseline results.
Multipliers reported in column 2 and 3 are computed from estimates of Equation 3.
Column 3 additionally controls for the interaction of SRi,t with Si,t , where both the
variables are measured in deviation from the mean. Here SRi,t denotes the transfer
spending shock in the states that are in the same region as state i, excluding state i
itself. Column 4 multipliers are computed from estimates of Equation 2 but where
small states are aggregated into big states. All regressions include state and year
fixed effects. The standard errors clustered at the region × year level and robust to
heteroskedasticity are reported in square brackets.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5: Cumulative Multipliers for Aggregate State Output
(1) (2)
Shock as % of All Changes as %
State GDP of State GDP
M(t) -0.147 -0.230
[1.687] [0.513]
M(t +1) 0.281 0.556
[1.680] [0.666]
M(t +2) 2.465 -0.541
[1.950] [0.746]
M(t +3) 1.952 -1.506
[2.516] [1.394]
M(t +4) 1.960 -1.335
[2.149] [1.116]
M(t +5) 1.686 -1.202
[2.174] [1.109]
Poverty Ratios Yes Yes
Lags of Ystate Yes Yes
Observations 621 621
Notes: The dependent variable Ystate in all the regressions is the
year-on-year percentage change in real per capita state output.
Multipliers reported in column 1 are computed using the estim-
ates of Equation 4. Column 2 reports the computed multipliers
using estimates obtained by replacing exogenous changes in trans-
fer spending with all changes in transfer spending in Equation 4.
All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The standard
errors clustered at the region× year level and robust to heteroske-
dasticity are reported in square brackets.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6: Cumulative Multipliers from Spending under EGS
(1) (2)
EGS Shock All Changes
M(t) 1.474∗∗∗ 0.014
[0.497] [0.321]
M(t +1) 1.348∗ 0.115
[0.808] [0.424]
M(t +2) 1.951∗∗ 0.267
[0.939] [0.496]
M(t +3) 2.604∗∗ 0.424
[1.133] [1.116]
M(t +4) 2.250∗∗ 0.314
[0.881] [0.669]
M(t +5) 2.205∗∗ 0.314
[0.891] [0.742]
Poverty Ratios Yes Yes
Lags of Y Yes Yes
Observations 621 621
Notes: The dependent variable in all the regressions is
the year-on-year percentage change in per capita real
agricultural output. Multipliers reported in column 1
are computed using the estimates of Equation 2 but with
exogenous changes in employment spending. Column 2
reports the multipliers that are computed using estim-
ates obtained by replacing exogenous changes with all
changes in employment spending in Equation 2. All re-
gressions include state and year fixed effects. The stand-
ard errors clustered at the region× year level and robust
to heteroskedasticity are reported in square brackets.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
39
Table 7: Multipliers after Dropping Major Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop
North South Center γt αi
M(t) 1.534∗∗∗ 1.035∗ 1.716∗∗∗ 1.688∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗
[0.536] [0.607] [0.576] [0.467] [0.534]
M(t +1) 1.575∗ 1.289 2.008∗∗∗ 0.865 1.102
[0.892] [0.848] [0.739] [0.655] [0.734]
M(t +2) 2.274∗∗ 1.849∗ 2.670∗∗∗ 1.241∗ 1.655∗∗
[1.048] [1.027] [0.906] [0.662] [0.844]
M(t +3) 2.386∗ 2.524∗∗ 2.196∗ 1.775∗∗ 2.044∗∗
[1.268] [1.237] [1.304] [0.818] [0.876]
M(t +4) 2.234∗∗ 2.077∗∗ 2.277∗∗ 1.657∗∗∗ 1.843∗∗
[0.988] [0.960] [1.102] [0.641] [0.731]
M(t +5) 2.153∗∗ 2.083∗∗ 2.220∗∗ 1.553∗∗ 1.811∗∗
[1.002] [0.970] [1.111] [0.674] [0.731]
Poverty Ratios Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lags of Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 513 513 459 621 621
Notes: The dependent variable in all the regressions is the year-on-year percentage
change in real per capita agricultural output. Northern region: Haryana, Himachal
Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh; Southern region: Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu; Central: Chhattisgarh, Goa, Gujarat, Maharashtra,
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan. Results are stable (not reported) if we drop the
small states in the north-east as well like Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Manipur,
Nagaland, and Sikkim. Regressions in column 1-3 include state and year fixed ef-
fects. Column 4 drops the year effects while column 5 drops state fixed effects. The
standard errors clustered at the region × year level and robust to heteroskedasticity
are reported in square brackets.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Appendix
A Data Appendix
Program Expenditure: Expenditure data for the development programs has been col-
lected from (i) Annual Reports of the Ministry of Rural Development (hereafter referred
as MORD) from 1980-81 to 2010-11; (ii) Annual Plan documents of the Planning Com-
mission from 1980-81 to 2010-11; (iii) Rural Development Statistics from the National
Institute of Rural Development; (iv) indiastat.com; and (v) nrega.nic.in. Our expendit-
ure figures correspond to the latest estimates as there can be a substantial difference
between the provisional and revised expenditure estimates.
The expenditure data is collected state-wise with annual frequency from 1980 to
2010. The data on a particular program is for the years during which it is active. In
the year 2000, three new states: Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Uttarakhand were carved
from Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh respectively. For the sake of homogen-
eity and a balanced panel, we aggregate all the data of these new states with their re-
spective former states. Furthermore, Mizoram and Jammu & Kashmir are not included
in the study due to the unavailability of real agricultural output data before 1993. We
hence have a panel data of 23 states and 30 years (690 observations).
State Aggregates: Data for the Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) and the state
agricultural output has been collected (as on 28-03-2013) from the National Accounts
Statistics, Central Statistics Office. We use the real and nominal state GDP series to
construct state-specific deflators.
Poverty: Poverty estimates are from the Planning Commission Report of the Expert
Group to Review the Methodology for Measurement of Poverty. The report gives state-
wise information on the number of persons below the poverty for the years: 1977, 1983,
1987, 1993, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2011. We interpolate (assuming constant growth
between any two data points) to get annual poverty estimates between 1980 and 2010.
Data for Figure 1: Employment data is from National Sample Survey reports on the
Employment and Unemployment Situation in the Country for various rounds between
1993 and 2011. National output and national agricultural output data is from Central
Statistics Office (CSO).
Population: 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011 Census of India.
B Narrative Analysis
Below we discuss a thorough program by program construction of our narrative shock
series. Xi,t denotes the expenditure incurred under the program ‘X’ for the state i in the
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year t where X ∈ {NREP, JRY, SGSY, JGSY, SGRY, NREGA}
Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP)
Implemented: 1978; Until: 1998
Introductory variation does not contribute to the shock series
Reason: State-wise data not available before 1985
IRDP was arguably the first major rural development program that was launched in
1978. The program cost was equally shared between the central government and the
states. The objective of the program was to alleviate rural poverty by “providing in-
come generating assets and access to credit and other inputs” (Annual Report MoRD
1980, p. 3) to “all persons who live below the poverty line” (p. 4). The program was
initially introduced in 2,300 blocks in the country but was “extended to all the devel-
opment blocks in the country” (p. 4) by 2nd October 1980. The principal motivation to
introduce the program was therefore not output or growth related. Hence the increase in
transfer spending during program introduction can be regarded as exogenous variation.
However, since state-wise data for IRDP is not available before 1985, IRDP does not
contribute to the construction of the narrative shock series.
National Rural Employment Program (NREP)
Implemented: 1980; Until: 1988
Program expenditure at the national level:
1980: |11.97 billion (2004 prices)
Exogenous change in state-level transfers:
∆si,1980: NREPi,1980
To tackle the serious problem of rural unemployment and under-employment, the food
for work program was launched on the 1st of April 1977 (Annual Report MoRD 1980-
81, p. 17). The report also quotes that although the program was “successful in achiev-
ing its basic objectives ... a number of shortcomings and drawbacks were noticed in the
implementation of the food for work program” (p. 18). With the motivation to address
the shortcomings in the food for work program, NREP “replaced the Food for Work
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Program in October, 1980” (Annual Report MoRD 1982-83, p. 30) and was financed
by the central government up till 31st March 1981 while the cost was equally shared
between the central and the state government from 1982-83 (p. 32). The program en-
visaged generation of gainful employment for both unemployed and underemployed
workers in the rural areas.
Allocation of funds from the central government was based on the incidence of
poverty and the population of agricultural laborers in a state (Annual Report MoRD
1982-83). Payment of wages was partly in the form of food grains and partly in cash.
Projects like afforestation, drinking water wells, and community irrigation wells were
undertaken under NREP. Expenditure occurred under NREP in all the states during
1980-81 serves as exogenous introductory spending.
Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY)
Implemented: 1989; Until: 1998
Program expenditure at the national level:
1989: |66.34 billion (2004 prices)
Exogenous change in state-level transfers:
∆si,1989: JRYi,1989−NREPi,1988−RLEGPi,1988
The Annual Plan 1990-91 of the Planning Commission notes:
“Experience of implementation of NREP|RLEGP over the years showed
that whereas the Government of India’s objective in starting these programs
was to tackle the problems of unemployment of unskilled rural laborers, the
distribution of funds by the States in different regions and districts did not
follow this logic. The funds did not invariably go to the areas of the con-
centration of unemployed landless and rural labour . . . The type of assets
being created were not economically productive. The system of approval
of the projects was such that it left much to be desired” (p. 65).
To intensify the process of employment generation and address the above concerns, the
two older employment schemes NREP and RLEGP were merged into a substantially
bigger program: Jawahar Rozgar Yojana on 1st April 1989. In line with previous em-
ployment programs, the primary objective of JRY was the provision of employment for
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the rural poor with the secondary objective as the development of productive infrastruc-
ture. The central government financed 80% of the program cost. Under the program,
assistance from the central government to the states was determined by the “proportion
of rural poor in a State/UT to the total rural poor in the country” (p. 37) Annual Report
1990-91 MoRD. Projects allowed under JRY were similar to the ones planned under
the previous programs. Since JRY was a result of the restructuring of two previous pro-
grams NREP and RLEGP, we do not treat it as a standalone program. However given
the significant increase in outlay earmarked for employment generation under JRY, we
consider JRY1989 − (NREP1988+ RLEGP1988) as exogenous introductory spending for
the year 1989-90. Since there is no evidence to suggest that JRY was implemented in
phases, only the change in employment expenditure due to the introduction of JRY in
1989-90 is considered to be exogenous variation in transfer spending.
Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS)
Implemented: 1993; Until: 2000
Introductory variation does not contribute to the shock series
Reason: Introductory variation is arguably endogenous
EAS was implemented from 2nd October 1993 in 1778 rural blocks of the country. The
program guaranteed 100 days of employment to a maximum of two adults per family.
The primary objective of EAS was to provide unskilled manual work during the lean
agricultural season to anyone who is “desirous of work, but cannot find it” (Annual
Report 1993-94 MoRD, p. 19). During its second year, the program was extended to
another 665 rural blocks of the country (p. 17). Expansion of EAS to cover all the rural
blocks of the country continued till 1997-98. The program cost was shared between the
central and the state government in the ratio 80:20 (later revised to 75:25). However, we
do not treat the introductory variation due to the implementation of EAS as exogenous.
This is because EAS was a demand driven scheme with no fixed allocation of funds for
any district or block. Hence according to the narrative evidence, any variation in pro-
gram expenditure is likely to be due to variation in the demand for the program which
is likely to be correlated with local economic conditions. Therefore, implementation of
EAS does not contribute towards the construction of our narrative shock series.
Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) &
Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (JGSY)
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SGSY Implemented: 1999; Until: Present
JGSY Implemented: 1999; Until: 2001
Program expenditure at the national level:
1999: |11.39 billion in SGSY (2004 prices)
1999: |24.19 billion in JGSY (2004 prices)
Exogenous change in state-level transfers:
∆si,1999: (SGSYi,1999− IRDPi,1998)+(JGSYi,1999− JRYi,1998)
Integrated Rural Development Program (that was implemented in 1978) also enveloped
several sub-schemes like Training of Rural Youth for Self Employment (TRYSEM),
Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) among others. While
all these schemes were supposed to operate complimentary to each other, over the years
individual program targets replaced the larger objective of poverty alleviation (p.40
Annual Report 1999-2000 MoRD). To address the deficiencies identified in the older
schemes, a comprehensive credit-cum-subsidy scheme: Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar
Yojana (SGSY) was launched on April 1, 1999, while IRDP and its allied programs
ceased to be in operation.
The focus of SGSY was to create self-employment among the rural poor. To achieve
this, a multi-pronged approach of micro-enterprise development, capacity building of
the poor (self-help groups), and credit technology was followed. The subsidy compon-
ent extended to individuals/groups under SGSY was only meant as an enabling element,
while a greater reliance was on the availability of credit. As mentioned in Annual Report
1999-2000 MoRD, individuals under the program were eligible to receive a subsidy of
30% of the project cost with the subsidy ceiling of |10,000. For group projects, the sub-
sidy was at 50% of the project cost subject to a maximum subsidy grant of a |1,25,000.
In the same year, the older employment program: Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) was
restructured into Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (JGSY) on 1st April 1999. Unlike the
previous programs like JRY and EAS where the primary objective was generation of
wage employment, the overriding priority of JGSY was the creation of demand driven
community village infrastructure with the secondary objective being the generation of
wage employment for the unemployed. The rule of 60:40 wage-material cost ratio out-
lined under the previous JRY for the creation of rural infrastructure was relaxed under
JGSY so as to enable the build-up of demand-driven rural infrastructure. Development
of infrastructure support for SGSY was given a priority under JGSY. However, heavy
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infrastructure investment related projects like building of bridges, secondary schools,
colleges, and roads were not permitted under JGSY (Annual Report 1999-2000 MoRD).
For both SGSY and JGSY, the program cost was divided between the Centre and
the States in the ratio 75:25. Hence in the financial year 1999-2000, two major rural
development programs: IRDP and JRY were restructured into SGSY and JGSY respect-
ively. Our exogenous measure of transfer spending for the year 1999-2000 accordingly
measures change in program expenditure because of the implementation of the new re-
structured programs. Thus, for 1999-2000, (SGSY1999 − IRDP1998) + (JGSY1999 −
JRY1998) is our measure of exogenous introductory spending. Since there is no evid-
ence that either SGSY or JGSY was implemented in phases, the introductory variation
is limited to the year of introduction of the two programs. Since IRDP along with many
other small duplicate schemes were discontinued and replaced with SGSY, this gener-
ally resulted in an exogenous contraction of transfer spending during 1999-2000.
Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY)
Implemented: 2001; Until: 2007
Program expenditure at the national level:
2001: |47.02 billion (2004 prices)
Exogenous change in state-level transfers:
∆si,2001: (SGRY -Ii,2001−SGRY -Iprovi,2001)+(SGRY -IIi,2001−SGRY -IIprovi,2001)
SGRY was launched on 25th September 2001. After the restructuring of JRY into JGSY
in 1999, EAS became the major wage-employment generation program while JGSY
was more focused on the creation of rural infrastructure. To achieve comprehensive
rural development, an ambitious program: SGRY was launched to take care of food
security, employment generation, and rural infrastructure development. SGRY initially
operated under two streams where EAS and JGSY were respectively restructured into
SGRY-I and SGRY-II. Total SGRY funds were equally divided between the two streams.
SGRY was implemented as one from 2004-05 (Annual Report 2005-06 MoRD, p. 2).
Rural infrastructure development under SGRY involved projects like drought proofing
(for e.g., soil and moisture conservation), afforestation, and promotion of traditional
water resources, among others. A ‘Special Component’ of SGRY geared towards aug-
menting food security started from 1st April 2002 (Annual Report 2002-03 MoRD, p.
11).
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The special component was a demand driven sub-scheme where the central as-
sistance was extended (only in terms of food grains) to the states in times of natural
disasters like drought, earthquake, cyclone, flood, etc. Naturally, expenditure pertain-
ing to the special component is not included in our shock series which may otherwise
downward bias our multiplier estimates. The central government financed 75% of the
program cost. However, unlike most new programs, SGRY was not introduced at the
start of the financial year and was instead implemented during the end of the second
quarter of the financial year 2001-02. Construction of the exogenous variation becomes
a challenge in this case since the state-wise annual expenditure estimates for SGRY-I
and SGRY-II during 2001-02 also contain funds utilized under EAS and JGSY until
October 2001.
As a workaround to this, we use the provisional expenditure estimates of SGRY-
I and SGRY-II during 2001-02 to estimate the funds utilized under EAS and JGSY
between April-October 2001. Annexures in the Annual Reports of MORD provide
actual program expenditure estimates for the previous years, while only provisional
estimates are provided for the current fiscal year. Furthermore, the ‘reporting month’
(the month up to which the program expenditures have been reported) is also men-
tioned in the financial report. In the Annual Report 2001-02 MORD, the provisional
estimates for both SGRY-I and SGRY-II correspond to the reporting month of Octo-
ber or November 2001 (for most of the states). This consequently provides us with
an estimate of the expenditure that occurred before the introduction of SGRY. Hence
(SGRY -Ii,2001−SGRY -Iprovi,2001)+(SGRY -IIi,2001−SGRY -IIprovi,2001) represents the exogen-
ous change in transfer spending at state-level due to the introduction of SGRY in 2001.
The introductory variation is limited to 2001 since there is no evidence that the program
was expanded after 2001-02.
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA)
Implemented: 2006; Until: Present
Program expenditure at the national level:
2006: |78.69 billion (2004 prices)
2007: |132.30 billion (2004 prices)
Exogenous change in state-level transfers:
∆si,2006: NREGAi,2006
∆si,2007: NREGAi,2007−NREGAi,2006
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NREGA (later renamed as Mahatma Gandhi – NREGA) is often regarded as the largest
workfare program in the world. The program guarantees 100 days of manual labor
work to every rural household by organizing public works that are aimed at generating
and maintaining village infrastructure. NREGA was implemented in phases where 200
districts were covered under the program’s first phase in 2006-07. In the second phase,
130 additional districts were covered in 2007-08. The program covered all the districts
of the country by 2008-09. The program is almost completely funded by the central
government.
Since NREGA did not replace SGRY until 2008, NREGA’s first-year expenditure is
regarded as exogenous introductory variation while the increase in NREGA expendit-
ure from 2006 to 2007 is considered as exogenous variation for the year 2007. Although
there is clear evidence that NREGA expanded further in the third year, we do not con-
struct exogenous variation after the second year of NREGA. This is because by the
third year, it becomes progressively difficult to isolate exogenous changes in program
expenditure that occur specifically due to program expansion. The increase in govern-
ment expenditures across the board due to the stimulus package set-up by the Indian
government in early 2009, suggests that part of the counter-cyclical increase in social
transfers could be arguably endogenous. The exogenous introductory variation under
NREGA is therefore limited to 2006-07 and 2007-08.
Another valid concern is that given the size of NREGA, overall expenditure under
other programs may have declined during 2006-07 and 2007-08. However, we find
no significant negative correlation between NREGA expenditure and the year-on-year
change in aggregate expenditure under SGSY, SGRY, and IAY (at state-level) during
2006 and 2007. It is reassuring to note that the results do not change even if we replace
the NREGA shocks with the year-on-year variations in aggregate expenditure: SGSY +
SGRY + NREGA + IAY in 2006 and 2007. The latter choice of shocks is, however, sus-
ceptible to endogeneity since expenditure variations in the other programs may reflect
local output fluctuations and hence is not our preferred choice of expenditure shocks
due to NREGA implementation.
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